

175 reservation community is needed before application for *division* may
648 be made. The government's intentions and hopes seem not to have
423 changed, however. This is reflected quite graphically by the fact that
a census of Mapuche lands is broken down into "reservations di-
vided" and "reservations to be divided," the latter category including
all communities now having reservation status.

177 The reservation policy, involving as it does the entire problem of
648 the disposition of Mapuche lands, is the main area in which Chilean
692 and Indian politico-legal structures overlap. National-level politics
and laws have had tremendous influence on reservation political
[671] structure and legal concepts. *Admapu* (customary law) has been
brought into closer approximation with the Chilean system, and the
latter has made concessions to Mapuche juridical and social beliefs
and practices.

648 Before proceeding with a discussion of Mapuche law and political
organization, which cannot be divorced from the Chilean politico-
juridical system, it might be well to outline briefly the Chilean gov-
ernmental structure. In the first place, Chile is a republic with a
National Congress, composed of a Senate and a House of Deputies,
a system of courts, and a military and police organization. The nation
is divided into numerous Provinces which are subdivided into De-
partments, Subdelegations, and Districts, each with its elected or
appointed head and administrative body. An *Intendente* heads each
Province, a Governor each Department, a Subdelegate each Subdele-
gation, and an Inspector each District. Mapuche are Chilean nationals
and, upon proof of literacy, attain with maturity the right to vote
[641] and to be elected or appointed to any of the nation's political offices.
[666] In 1955 there were two Mapuche *Diputados*, several Inspectors, a
number of *regidores*, and at least one *alcalde* in Cautin Province. The
then Minister of Lands and Colonization was born and spent his early
years on a reservation.

Deputies are elected from one or more Departments, depending
on population, there being a proportion of one deputy to each 30,
000 inhabitants. In the indigenous zone, especially in Cautin Province
[162] with its estimated 100,000 or more reservation-dwelling Indians, the
Mapuche are able to swing local elections, even where they are not
actually in the majority, due to the existence of numerous splinter
[644] parties. They are becoming more conscious of regional-national poli-
[645] tics and are forming vocal pressure groups, literally Indian parties,
through which they express themselves on the national scene.

621 the Mapuche farmer, or when the Mapuche enters into a relationship
648 with another individual on a contractual or other legal basis. This
692 holds, too, in the courts where torts and crimes are adjudicated.

But on the supraindividual level, each reservation has a sense of
separateness, underscored by dominant kinship alignments, political
organization in the hands of a chief and adult males, territorial distinction,
economic resources, sponsorship of religious ceremonies, and so forth. Among these homologous units there exists relative
over-all stability. Factors of cultural and political nationalism tend to
integrate these otherwise independent units with respect to certain
national issues, but this is outside the traditional peacetime political
structure, and will be discussed later.

621 On the one hand there is the supreme political authority of the
648 Chilean government. This is mediated at the local level through
692 Indian-affairs officers, courts, and police. On the other hand there is
Mapuche customary law enforced by chiefs. The chiefs mediate Chile-
an law on the reservations. To the extent, however, that the chief's
role has been usurped by governmental action, by an effort to break
up the reservations and deal individually with the Mapuche of Chile-
an nationals, chieftainship has been considerably curtailed.

621 It seems clear that the rise of chieftainship depended on the reserva-
648 tion system. The Chilean government was at first unable to administer
692 the segmented Mapuche communities except through numerous
agents at the local level. Relationships between Chileans and Mapu-
che were through the offices of chiefs and the several governmental
officials at the provincial level. When the chiefs could no longer
monopolize these relationships, largely owing to the growth of diver-
gent economic interests on the reservations and a developing political
awareness on the part of the ordinary Indian, their organizational
authority began to slip from them. The government shared this de-
cline by fulfilling many of the services performed by the chiefs. For
example, local government officials are entrusted with policing the
reservations, building and maintaining schools, improving agricul-
ture, encouraging industry and commerce, repairing roads and other
public works, and many other things that formerly fell to the reserva-
tion Mapuche under the direction of their chiefs. The national gov-
ernment intentionally established a mechanism for effectively
bypassing the power of chiefs. The intention is symbolized in one
respect in the various "percentage" clauses in the land-allotment
legislation.

666 often hold important positions in the reservation community, being
[623] elders of the lineage. There is fairly keen interest among the young
and middle-aged men. Many of the older people, if they are not
too suspicious and cynical about the politicians and their promises,
are very cautious in expressing favor for one candidate or another.
The older Mapuche show a good deal of interest in learning who a
certain Indian candidate is, that is, to whom he is related, where he
lives or where he was born, and tend to form their opinion of him
on the basis of what they might know about his relatives.

664 Allegiance to these pressure groups symbolizes a factionalism which
621 crosscuts Mapuche society. In concluding this section, I offer the
622 following example of factionalism at the local, reservation level. It
578 will serve to point up something of the connection between a chief's
loss of traditional political power, his new role as a member of one
of the Mapuche pressure groups or political societies, and how the
question of *división* affects political relationships on the reservation.

[428] A chief in the Roble Huacho region, a younger son of the original
title holder of reservation land, inherited his office from his elder
brother in 1949, when the latter died. The title had passed to the
older brother at the time of the father's death some thirty years be-
fore. The brother's sons were considered too young to assume the
responsibility of leadership, all being under thirty at the time. These
[691] young men acknowledged this in 1949 and said that the transference
of title to their uncle was *admapu*, that is, in conformance with cus-
tomary law. Several factors have operated to change their position
today.

At the present time these young men claim that the title to reserva-
tion land is no longer of importance to them, that they are interested
[648] only in *división*. They point out that the Chilean government does
not officially recognize the transfer of chieftainship from the original
title holder to a succession of heirs. But this is an *ex post facto* ra-
tionalization, also doubtless reflecting awareness of the legal aspects
of the reservation system as well.

One of these young men, however, is now an active member of the
Unión Araucana, an organization in favor of *división*. He has mus-
tered a sufficient number of household heads to vote in favor of
división, one-third being the minimum required. A plea for *división*
was made before the *Fiesta de Indios* in 1951, at which time the legal
machinery went into action with reference to this specific reservation.

Marriage may be further solemnized by Catholic rites, important less for the religious significance than because church registration and the civil registration which accompanies Chilean marriages establish the legitimacy of heirs in the framework of the national legal code. Such registration also gives a widow stronger claim to land after her husband's death, a claim which will stand up better in the Indian court against the "traditional" claim of the dead man's brothers. [585 428 097]

Kureyewen (the act of carrying off the bride), *capto*, or *robo* involves the "stealing" of the bride-to-be from her kinsmen and, in effect, is equatable with elopement. It is most often carried out with an awareness on the part of the girl's parents that marriage is in the offing, inasmuch as the young man has usually spent months or even years courting their daughter. The exact night of the elopement is kept secret, perhaps being arranged on the spur of the moment by the sweethearts. The groom might take a friend into his confidence to assist him in the escapade. If the girl's parents are known not to be especially watchful, the elopement might take place without any outside help. If the young man fails, or if there is danger of his doing so, another date is set. [671] 583

The young man, then, "steals" his sweetheart from her family in the dark of night when the household has retired. He takes her to his parent's house equally secretly. Both families are apprised of the fact the following morning, the one by the presence of the girl, the other by her absence.

The man's family do not always know of his plan to run off with his sweetheart, and their reactions vary according to the young man's status in the household, their opinion of the girl, their relationship with her family, and the mental adjustments they have made to the young woman's presence in the house. While there are idiosyncratic reactions in these circumstances, events follow discernible patterns.

The day following the elopement, the young man, his sweetheart, and most of the members of his household sit around the fire and discuss the couple's plans and prospects. The discussion is led by the man's father, who for the first time plays a direct and forceful role in the matter regardless of how long it might have been brewing, and who usually admonishes the young couple for being too precipitous and inconveniencing their parents. Almost as a matter of form he suggests that they postpone the nuptials until they are a year or so older. Sometimes this is phrased indirectly by pointing out that the young man would have to be given a share in the family harvest, and [583 581]

Introduction

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analytically separable segments. As mentioned, I concentrate on the most dramatic of these. This selectivity, however, is by no means wholly arbitrary. Rather, it is a result of analysis, for the areas of morality and its ritual attributes herein discussed appear as those of greatest concern to the Mapuche themselves. I do not claim to have discovered this, as my reference to other works indicates, but I will say that the overwhelming importance of the rituals I discuss for the structure of Mapuche morality became apparent to me only during my analysis of the largely secular institutions of Mapuche society.

Mapuche morality is a kin-based, systematic body of concepts and associated behavior, in spite of certain seeming inconsistencies and discrepancies. How does this moral system, then, support or impinge upon various segments of a larger kinship, political unit, ritual congregation? In what ways do kinship, politics, ritual action, and religious belief cause groups to precipitate out from total Mapuche society? How are these groups identified? To what extent do they overlap and under what conditions? And, lastly, what might be considered certain pervasive features of behavior or belief which permit a general moral system to operate effectively throughout Mapucheland?

The overall impression is that Mapuche morality is a religious morality involving a concept of the opposition of the forces of good and evil. Morality cannot be understood apart from supernatural sanctions and the nature of the continuum between the living and the dead—both authentic and mythical ancestor-gods—in the framework of lineal and congregational (multi-lineal) units of population. All traditional rights and duties are supernaturally sanctioned, and conflicts, arising mostly from contacts with non-Mapuche, are handled with reference to these traditional moral sanctions.

Customary law (*admapu*) is a fundamentally supernatural concept, sanctioned by supernatural forces emanating from the very ancestors considered to have derived, supplemented, and adhered to the rules of Mapuche society. "We do these things because our ancestors did them and because our fathers and grandfathers told us that they are right." These words are the gist of all answers to the anthropologist's questions about belief

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- 671 and customary activity. They reveal the general reason why
 579 personal belongings are interred with the dead; why the ollentos
 183 lays hold of the palpitating heart of the sacrificed sheep, bites
 into it, and passes it on to the next in line; why clay or wooden
 vessels instead of porcelain or enamelware are used in traditional
 rites; why chicha rather than wine should be drunk or passed in
 libation on certain ceremonial occasions; why preferred marriage
 is matrilineal; why kinship terms are extended under certain
 circumstances to Mapuche who are nonkin; why a *halla* should
 be executed by the community, then dismembered and burned;
 (182) why killing a white man is ineffective to the gods. A detailed
 consideration of these and other beliefs and actions will show
 why the single most important integrative force operative in
 Mapuche society is the moral order which defines institutional
 behavior.

- 121 If, then, Mapuche morality may be characterized legitimately
 as a religious morality, just what is the specific nature of the
 relationship between morality, the supernatural environment,
 and other aspects of the social structure? What, for example,
 does Mapuche ritual celebrate, and on what occasions? What is
 the connection between public ritual, dramatic performance,
 and the sorcerer's black art? A partial answer to these questions
 could be obtained from a cultural analysis of Mapuche values.
 But a sociological interpretation, showing social action in the
 framework of its content, would seem more fruitful, more
 complete. In any case, that is the course followed here. In this
 monograph, emphasis is on the sociology of Mapuche morality,
 although adequate descriptions of Mapuche culture are provided
 to give context to the social relationships and to make possible a
 structural analysis of symbolic values.

- 579 Mapuche morality involves rights and duties enjoyed and
 182 imposed by virtue of membership both in total Mapuche society
 and in particular segments thereof. The moral force which makes
 (671) conformity to Mapuche customary law desirable as well as
 compelling—a truly persuasive or repressive force—is continually
 found as the binding element in public ritual expression and
 in the total supernatural content of the priest, shaman, sorcerer,
 and layman alike.

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infirmité of the group who pays brideprice is symbolized in a number of ways (see Chapter One, pp. 41-45). Rather than being equal, there is a great, symbolically significant and obligatory imbalance in goods transferred at the occasion of marriage, consistent with the relative infirmité of the wife-receiving group.

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[601] It will be remembered that there is no direct exchange of women among the Mapuche lineages, the system being one of generalized exchange, strong preference accounting for the vast majority of marriages being contracted with matrilineally linked groups. On the face of it, this is a triadic structure in which are involved one's own lineage, one's wife-giving lineage, and the wife-receiving group into which one's lineage sisters marry. This relationship is symbolized in the kinship terminology, in which wife-receivers are designated as "brother-in-law" (*tilles*: the one who has purchased) and wife-givers as "maternal uncle" (*waka*), as I have already indicated. One's own lineage consists of brothers, fathers, etc. The terms used for one's own lineage members are potentially extensible to all Mapuche who do not fall into a marriage-linked category which, being more than a sentimental attachment to fellow Mapuche, expresses the structural boundaries of the marriage system. But the normally triadic structure involved in this kind of exchange system reduces to dyadic component relationships with respect to any marriage-linked units, affinals always standing in either the *tilles* or the *waka* category, as wife-receiver and wife-giver, with respect to each other.

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691 Now for the problem of why the Mapuche insist that marriage with mother's brother's daughter is the ideal union, one which they say was law (*admapu*) a generation or so ago. As I have indicated elsewhere, genealogies do not show that marriage with one mother's brother's daughter takes place with significant frequency; that it is in fact a rare occurrence (Faron 1960a, c; 1961). Since all marriageable women are called by the same term, *tsaka*, men marry, in the absence of exact genealogical knowledge, classificatory mother's brother's daughters in a generalized system of exchange. Therefore, the anthropologist's acceptance of this statement as literal truth is wrong. But what does the Mapuche expression of this ideal marriage form mean?